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Abstract 
The U.S. International Trade in Armaments Regulations (ITAR) regime is a major 
national security and public policy issue.  Exploring the ITAR environment through a 
set of case studies was the central idea in a project involving participants at 
Cranfield University (UK) and the Naval Postgraduate School.   
Our colleagues investigated the effects of ITAR within the ongoing F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter program, which involves the U.S. and a number of international 
partners, including the UK.  The Cranfield report (under separate cover) was based 
on a survey of UK stakeholders.  The results were unambiguous and striking.  Our 
British partners  conclude ITAR is a good idea gone horribly awry.  Section II 
provides a summary. 
Our main interest (Section III) is the F/A-18 tactical fighter program, which 
eventually involved many international partners.  This collaboration was highly 
successful and managed to the general satisfaction of the parties involved.  It was, 
in short, a significantly different outcome within the ITAR regime. 
An introduction (Section I) provides a brief overview of ITAR and illustrates the 
reasons for its being controversial.  Finally, our concluding section summarizes the 
Obama Administration’s initiative to reform ITAR and offers some questions for 
further research in export controls in the global defense marketplace. 
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I. Introduction 
This report primarily concerns the F/A-18 as a U.S. arms export and as a 
case illustrating the operations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) 
regime.  It is a companion piece to a study done by our colleagues at Cranfield 
University at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom titled, Impact of U.S. 
Export Control and Technology Transfer Regime on the Joint Strike Fighter(JSF) 
Project—Views of Key UK Stakeholders (Ito, 2011), which is summarized in Section 
II below.   
Section I provides a brief overview of the ITAR regime.  There is no intent to 
undertake a comprehensive introduction or to fully summarize the process.  In fact, 
there is good reason to believe the “process” has been ill defined and not 
transparent (e.g., Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2007).  Section I will 
instead explain what ITAR is intended to do and will provide some understanding of 
the current controversies that attend that regime. 
Section II summarizes the report filed by our colleagues in the UK, whose 
findings and conclusions are a persuasive indictment of the current ITAR system.  
Section III contains our main effort—a case history of the F/A-18 as an international 
program.  Taken with the Cranfield study, it indicates that outcomes vary across 
programs.  This section also offers hypotheses about variables that affect outcomes 
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II. ITAR: A Brief Overview 
This background section provides a very brief overview of the U.S. export 
control scheme, known generally as ITAR (International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations),1 and some of its consequences.  The ITAR regime was originally 
instituted primarily to prevent the export of U.S. and allied military technology to the 
Soviet Bloc during the Cold War, and as part of a multilateral framework.  Principal 
legislative authority for the ITAR export control regulations is the Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976 (U.S.C. 2778(a)(2), which, inter alia, assigns regulation of the 
import and export of defense products to the Executive Branch. 
The ITAR regime seeks to safeguard U.S. military technology by ensuring that 
sharing of U.S. military technologies (and related information) occurs only with U.S. 
persons, or after receiving U.S. Government approval (via specific approval or 
special exemption). 
These export controls are executed by performing a number of tasks, 
including the following; 
 maintaining a list of goods and services to be controlled—the United 
States Munitions List (USML); 
 maintaining a registry of vetted persons who are eligible to apply for 
permission to export items on the USML;  
 screening and evaluating applications for exports (or provision of 
related technical information) from the Munitions List to “non-US 
persons;” 
 controlling resale (“retransfer”) of Munitions-List items to third parties; 
and  
 enforcing the ITAR regime (of course).  
                                            
1 Those interested in becoming more fully informed about ITAR can find an excellent starting point in 
Wikpedia’s ITAR article (“International Traffic in Arms Regulations,” 2011) and in the Wikipedia Arms 
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A. ITAR Rationale 
The reasons for controlling military technology and keeping military materials 
from enemies, or potential enemies, are as old as organized warfare.  It is generally 
fashionable (and likely correct) to consider the human element of war as being more 
important than the materiel.  However, even if the three-to-one assessment offered 
in the old saying2 is literally true, a one-third advantage in combat effectiveness can 
nonetheless be decisive.   
There are other reasons to protect intellectual property in various forms, as 
the Russians have recently learned in their dealings with China.  According to a 
number of reports (e.g., Page, 2010), the Chinese have purchased Russian tactical 
fighters and have exploited those sales in ways counter to Russian national interest.  
For example, China ordered 24 Su-27s from Russia in 1992.  In 1996, the two 
countries reached an agreement for licensed production of 200 Su-27s (called the J-
11).  In 2004, the Chinese cancelled the contract after completing half of the license 
agreement.  Fairly soon thereafter, China introduced the J-11B—with 90% domestic 
content (according to official statements).  Chinese tactical fighters are now actively 
competing against Russian exports in a number of countries, including areas in 
Russia’s “near abroad” like Azerbaijan.  As one Russian official put it, “we didn’t pay 
enough attention to our intellectual property …” (Page, 2010).3   
While Page’s (2010) report emphasizes commercial damages to the Russian 
aircraft industry, the harm also extends to Russian national interests.  Directly, China 
competes with Russia for military sales—that also involve political ties and leverage.  
Indirectly, Chinese copies affect the capabilities of Russia’s defense industries, 
which likely can’t survive only on the Russian internal defense market (even with 
                                            
2 The three-to-one weighting is generally attributed to Napoleon: “In warfare, the moral is to 
the material as three is to one” (Napoleon). 
3 More detailed discussions of the J-11 are available at Air Force World (“J-11,” 2010), and 
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higher energy prices).  Moreover, this  is part of a long-established pattern of 
technical “borrowing” of various kinds going back many decades—certainly into the 
Cold War era and Chinese practice since then (Saunders & Wiseman, 2011; 
Tsypkin, 1992).  
B. ITAR Outcomes 
There is a significant body of anecdotal experience with ITAR outcomes, 
which includes successes.  In 2005, for example, ITAR enforcement prevented the 
retransfer of F-16s from Venezuela to Iran (ITAR, 2011).  In short, ITAR restrictions 
prevented retransfer of a first-line U.S. tactical fighter to a declared adversary.  
There were subsequent reports of the Iranians seeking fighter aircraft from Russia 
and China, but none of these initiatives have yet borne fruit (“Islamic Republic of Iran 
Air Force,” 2011).  
However, there are also costs, which appear in a number of forms.  First are 
the registration fees and administrative costs of dealing with the ITAR bureaucracy.  
In this context, it is worth noting that the Government Accountability Office (GAO; 
2005) reported an increase in nominal ITAR processing times in this decade, which 
means higher costs per case both for defense firms and the U.S. Government.  
These direct costs also include ITAR compliance personnel within defense firms 
(“ITAR,” 2011).  In a perhaps untypical example, Boeing reported (in 2006) that over 
100 people in the 787 program were dealing with export-control matters (Gates, 
2006). 
Second are the indirect costs (difficult to quantify) of firms taking measures to 
avoid the ITAR regime.  The motivations for doing this are made abundantly clear in 
our British colleagues’ Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)-focused report, which is 
summarized in this report and has also been published under separate cover.   
To take one example, Boeing, according to one source, “embarked on surreal 
tasks” to keep its new 787 transport aircraft completely out of ITAR reach (Gates, 
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State Department alleged 94 violations of the Arms Export Control Act because of 
exports of commercial jets which contained a “tiny gyrochip” with defense 
applications (Gates, 2006).  In response, Boeing management concluded that the 
787 must be “ITAR-free” in order to avoid significant reductions in export sales.  
Beyond the man-hours directly expended, , there are other questions to consider, 
such as the following: 
 To what extent were Boeing engineers driven to “second-best” design 
choices to avoid ITAR strictures?  For example, structural members 
that would have been aluminum in previous generations were simply 
replaced with composites (a “black aluminum” design; Gates, 2006). 
This falls short of the technology embodied in aircraft such as the B-2 
and F-35.  To what extent did the black aluminum design reflect 
prudent technical conservatism or acceptance of an inferior approach 
motivated by the need to avoid ITAR? 
 To what extent did the diversion of technical and management 
resources into resolving ITAR difficulties prevent Boeing from 
forestalling or mitigating the well-publicized difficulties of the 787? 
C. Other Unintended Consequences 
In addition, U.S. export control regulations have been much criticized over the 
years by partners in multinational projects.  Criticisms have stressed difficulties 
encountered in retaining operational sovereignty by the buying state, resulting, on 
occasion, in a reluctance to acquire American weapon systems.4  This issue has 
been stressed by some as an important reason behind the recent decision by India 
to reject the U.S. entries of the F-16 and F/A-18 into its competition for a Medium 
Multi-Role Aircraft (Majumdar, 2011).  The French have been widely reported to 
have stressed technical sharing in their efforts to sell the Rafale to Brazil (e.g., Colitt, 
2010). 
                                            
4 Operational or “appropriate” sovereignty is a key theme in the UK’s defense industrial strategy (UK 
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Also, there is reason to believe that the ITAR regime has generally lessened 
the international competitiveness of American industry.  Supporting evidence is 
found, for example, in studies of ITAR and the commercial space industry by Ryan 
Zelnio (2006a, 2006b, 2007).  He asserts, and offers empirical support for, adverse 
affects on U.S. firms’ positions in the international commercial space market 
associated with changes in ITAR enforcement practices:  
prior to the change … , the US dominated the commercial satellite-
manufacturing field, with an average market share of 83 percent.  Since that 
time, market share has declined to 50 percent.  While this cannot be blamed 
entirely on changes in export regulation, they have played a significant role in 
the decline. (Zelnio, 2006b) 
While the Zelnio (2007) study cited (a) concerns one industrial sector and (b) 
has apparently not yet received standard peer review, the conclusions deserve 
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III. The Cranfield F-35 Study 
The Cranfield study, “Impact of U.S. Export Control and Technology Transfer 
Regime on the Joint Strike Fighter(JSF) Project—Views of Key UK Stakeholders,” is 
a serious and successful effort to determine the nature of ITAR system impacts on 
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF or F-35) project from the perspective of UK industry and 
government players (Ito, 2011).  Specifically, the study set out to ascertain UK 
stakeholders’ perspectives for both development of the aircraft and the F-35’s 
logistic support.   
Our colleagues’ conclusions are unambiguous and should be cause for 
concern among U.S. policy makers.  Although the UK respondents believe the ITAR 
regime serves legitimate and useful purposes, it is, in practice, costly and 
counterproductive—“fundamentally flawed in its implementation” (Ito, 2011, p. 31).  
The predominant UK perspective that surfaced is that the ITAR system in practice 
(a) creates delays, (b) discourages (to the point of effective prohibition) cost-saving 
measures and innovations, (c) unnecessarily restricts information sharing, and (d) 
makes supply chain management unnecessarily complicated.  One primary cause 
for dissatisfaction is the tendency of the U.S. Government to implement ITAR 
directives to protect everything, without any real sense of what information is critical 
and what is not.  It “fails to provide a focus on effective security for truly sensitive 
items.”  Moreover, there was considerable “frustration with the extent to which U.S. 
requirements come into play on non-U.S. military items, such as the Eurofighter 
Typhoon.” (Ito, et al., 2011, p. 2). 
The result is an export and technology control system that actively (a) delays 
development and acquisition, (b) discourages cost reduction measures, and (c) 
impedes improvement in performance of the equipment purchased.  Moreover, the 
UK respondents suspect that the ITAR system, as currently implemented, is not very 
good at protecting sensitive U.S. technology.  Consequently, there is considerable 
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the U.S. ITAR regime.  As the Right Honourable James Arbuthnot put it, “I would 
encourage UK industry to design around the U.S. International Trafficking in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) and produce ITAR-free items.” (Chairman of the UK House of 
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IV. The Boeing F/A-18 Hornet5  
Our effort centers on a U.S. perspective based on past experience.  We 
chose to study a similar, but nonetheless different, program, the F/A-18 tactical 
fighter—with emphasis on its international dimensions.  From this study, a much 
different picture emerges.  We conclude that the F-18 international consortium has 
been well organized and well managed—with all concerned parties generally 
satisfied with the results.  We essay explanations for those differences below. 
A. Background and History 
The F/A-18 aircraft is a supersonic, all-weather, multi-role fighter designed for 
carrier operations against air or ground targets.  The aircraft is operated by the U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps principally from carriers; although, foreign buyers utilize it as 
a land-based system.  The prime contractor is Boeing (after its absorption of 
McDonnell Douglas) while Northrop Grumman serves as primary subcontractor.  
Northrop’s responsibilities include the center and aft fuselage sections of the aircraft 
while Boeing is responsible for the rest—this includes final assembly.  By work 
share, Northrop Grumman (formerly Northrop) provides about 40% and Boeing 
(formerly McDonnell Douglas) about 60%.   For the E/F model, discussed later in 
this section, Northrop’s work share increased slightly to 42%.    
The F/A-18 emerged from the U.S. Navy’s Naval Fighter-Attack, Experimental 
(VFAX) program that was charged with developing a multirole aircraft capable of 
replacing the A-4 Skyhawk, the A-7 Corsair II, remaining F-4 Phantom IIs  and to 
complement the F-14 Tomcat.6   
                                            
5  Various Wikipedia articles provide good historical and technical background information on the F/A-
18, especially the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet (2011) and VFAX (2010). The report on the 
Boeing F/A-18 by Richard Aboulafia (2010) is also very useful.    
6  In fact, the VFAX term applies to two specifications for two different naval fighter projects.  The first 
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Responding to 1973 Congressional mandate, the Navy sought a cheaper 
alternative to the F-14.  Grumman and McDonnell Douglas each proposed 
somewhat less expensive variants of the F-14 and F-15 but their costs were still 
viewed as too high.  Defense Secretary James Schlesinger then directed the Navy 
to examine the two competitors for the Air Force’s Lightweight Fighter (LWF) 
program, the General Dynamics YF-16 and the Northrop YF-17.  However, that 
program was focused on a day fighter without strike capacity and thus, failed to meet 
the Navy’s needs.  However, some in Congress saw the possibility of new 
technologies developed for the LWF program making a useful contribution to the 
Navy’s needs and in May 1974, the House Armed Services Committee transferred 
$34 million from the VFAX program to a new effort, the Navy Air Combat Fighter 
(NACF) program. 
Although the YF-16 won the Air Force LWF competition, its single engine and 
narrow landing gear led the Navy to conclude that it was not suitable for carrier 
service.  The YF-17, however, offered two engines and was seen as possibly of 
interest for naval needs.  Subsequently, the Navy received permission to pursue 
such possibilities and it asked McDonnell Douglas and Northrop to design a new 
aircraft using the configuration and design principles which had been utilized on the 
YF-17.  Northrop had recruited McDonnell as a secondary contractor to benefit from 
its long experience in building carrier aircraft. 
What emerged from the partnership was the F-18, and while it differed 
significantly from the YF-17, its family connection should be recognized.  On the F-
18, the two companies originally planned to evenly divide the parts production with 
McDonnell building the wings, stabilators, forward fuselage, and being responsible 
                                                                                                                                       
control, escort, and air-to-ground missions in the early 1960s.  This vision was eliminated when the F-
14 Tomcat was selected as the VFX winner, but it soon became clear that this aircraft was too 
expensive to replace the variety of missions performed by all Navy fighter and attack models.  The 
second VFAX saw the Navy “invited” by the Secretary of Defense to examine the entrants to the Air 
Force’s Lightweight Fighter Program.  As noted in text, the Navy selected the loser of the Air Force 
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for the final assembly, while Northrop was to build the center and aft fuselage and 
vertical stabilizers.  Northrop saw a possible export market for a land-based version 
(the F-18L) and assumed prime contractor responsibility and final assembly of that 
version while McDonnell acted as prime contractor for the naval version.7   
McDonnell undertook substantial modifications of the YF-17 to prepare it for 
carrier operations.  These modifications enlarged and modified the structure of the 
aircraft and added to its range.  A most important modification was to replace the 
computer-assisted control system of the YF-17 with a digital fly-by-wire system with 
quadruple-redundancy, the first to be introduced into a production fighter aircraft.8   
Northrop’s9 hopes for a significant export market for the F-18L were not 
realized.  The F-16 became highly successful on export markets and Northrop’s 
relations with McDonnell deteriorated over what Northrop saw as a violation of 
original plans to avoid direct competition abroad between the F/A-18 and F-18L.  
Northrop sued McDonnell in late 1979 for unauthorized use of Northrop technology 
for foreign sales of the F/A-18. The case was settled in 1985 when McDonnell paid 
Northrop $50 million for full rights to the design with no admission of wrongdoing.  
The significance of the settlement was limited because by then, Northrop had ended 
work on the F-18L. 
                                            
7 The original plan called for production of three versions—a single seat fighter, a single seat 
attack plane, and a dual seat trainer that contained full mission capability except for a 
reduced fuel load.  Improvements in stores stations and more advanced avionics and 
multifunction displays enabled the separate fighter and attack versions to be combined into 
a single aircraft.  This was recognized in 1980 and the name was formally changed in April 
1984 to the F/A-18A.  The two seat model became known as the F/A-18B (“McDonnell 
Douglas F/A-18 Hornet,” 2011). 
8  Another significant improvement resulted from having the issue of maintenance 
incorporated into the design, which resulted in the F/A-18 requiring much less downtime 
than heavier predecessors such as the F-14 Tomcat and the A-6 Intruder.  Its mean elapsed 
time between failures is three times greater than other strike aircraft and it requires half of 
the maintenance time.  The same design principles were utilized in the development of its 
General Electric F404 engines, which are less susceptible to stall and flameout than other 
comparable-sized engines (“McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet,” 2011). 
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The F/A-18A had its first flight in November, 1978, and its first Navy flight in 
March, 1979.  It entered operational service in Marine and Navy squadrons in 
January and March, 1983.  Its first combat operations took place in April 1986 during 
Operation Prairie Fire against Libyan air defenses.  Funding for the C/D models 
began soon after in the FY1986 budget.  The new model saw a number of 
improvements introduced.   
F/A-18C/Ds were equipped to carry up to six AMRAAM (Aim-120) missiles 
and up to four IR Maverick (AGM-65) missiles.  In addition, provision was made for 
integration of the AN/ALQ-165 Advanced Self-Protection (ASP) Jammer system and 
reconnaissance equipment.  Stores management was improved with upgraded 
computer hardware and memory capacity.  An improved mission computer and new 
Flight Incident Recorder and Monitoring Set (FIRAMS) were also installed.  Models 
produced after 1993 were equipped with APG-73 radar, which was more capable 
than the APG-65 original equipment. 
Despite these improvements, in 1987, the DoD commissioned McDonnell 
Douglas to study possibilities for further upgrade packages, with Project Hornet 
2000.  Four configurations were produced, which were aimed at addressing the 
frequent criticisms leveled at the F/A-18s: limited range and weapons load.  
Although Project Hornet 2000 was dropped, its studies provided useful approaches 
for the redesign of the A-D models into the E/F, or Super Hornet. 
The arrival of development funds for the E/F versions was accompanied by 
reductions in appropriated funds for the earlier C/D models --especially in FY1995 
and the DoD requested no R&D funding for C/D models in FY1997.  U.S. 
procurement of C/D models ended in FY1998 at a total figure of 635 aircraft. 
Although the E/F version continues the basic name and design concept of the 
original F/A-18, it was significantly redesigned.  Although originally maintaining 90% 
avionics and software commonality with the F/A-18C/D model, its airframe is 25% 
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engines.  Its weapons and fuel stores capacity have been significantly increased and 
it can be utilized as an aerial refueling tanker.  The newer models also provide 
frontal stealth qualities. 
The enhanced capabilities of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet are a possible 
explanation for the Navy’s decision not to seek to develop a direct replacement for 
the F-14 Tomcat.  The multiple mission suites of the Hornet and Super Hornet may 
have allowed the retirement of a sizeable number of specialized Navy aircraft,10 
which had been fulfilling its combat aircraft roles with an associated reduction in 
logistics complexity. 
The first production model of the Super Hornet was delivered to the Navy in 
December 1998.  It is built by a team consisting of Boeing, Northrop Grumman, GE 
Aircraft Engines, Raytheon, and more than 1,800 suppliers (domestic and foreign). 
B. Export Sales of the F/A-18 
The F/A-18 represents the largest multinational cooperative program in which 
the U.S. Navy has ever been involved.  To date, seven foreign countries have 
purchased variants of this aircraft, principally the A-D models, and Australia has also 
chosen to acquire the E/F model.  The others in the user community are Canada, 
Finland, Spain, Switzerland, Kuwait, and Malaysia.  With the exception of Canada, 
all of the others have chosen to use the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route.   
In other words, the export customers for the F-18 joined the acquisition 
process when it was almost complete.  The U.S. Navy was the intended customer 
for the F-18 in its original form.  Everything in the process from user needs to the 
Production Decision at Milestone C (inside a triangle) occurred with that in mind --  
only after the design was final, testing completed, and production well underway.  In 
                                            
10 Aboulafia (2010, p. 16) identifies such retired aircraft as the F-14, A-6, S-3, KA-6, and EA-
6.  While recognizing the associated loss of specialization, he concludes that “the Super 
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contrast, the F-35 JSF international partners became involved early on in the 
process, and as it turns out, that involvement has made a significant difference. 
Because the U.S. Navy is the military Service employing the F-18, with Navy 
practices, it is the intermediary that acts as the purchasing agent for the foreign 
buyers in dealing with the manufacturers of that product.  It should be noted that, 
unlike the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter case, these countries are buying an already 
existing aircraft currently in use by the U.S. Navy.  Hence, although slight 
modifications are possible, their role essentially is that of customer rather than 
partner. 
 
Figure 1. Lifecycle Framework View 
Matters such as the location of the assembly facility and the identity of the 
organization doing the assembly as well as subsequent maintenance and 
modification, unless specified in the respective Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs), is an issue for determination between the customer and the principal 
contractors.   In effect, this takes the U.S. Government outside of the  process 
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Throughout the entire post-World War II period, countries buying foreign 
aircraft and other advanced technology products have attempted to acquire the 
underlying technologies in order to lessen their dependence on foreign sources.  
Frequently, this goal also reflected a belief that advanced technologies were the key 
to modern economic growth and a higher standard of living.  These demands for 
industrial participation were often a major factor in selecting the winner of contract 
competitions (Udis, 2009).  Not infrequently, they led to conflict with the supplier 
state over a perceived need to protect what were viewed as technologies crucial to 
national security.  In the F/A-18 case, these conflicting goals were played out in the 
context of U.S. export control and technology transfer regulations. 
C. Export Controls and the International F/A-18 Program 
This section focuses on the export control issue but first, we will examine 
some production figures which have a bearing on the topic.  A recent Naval Air 
Systems Command (Navair) report identified total deliveries of F/A-18 aircraft 
between 1980 and 2000 at 1,480, which includes exports in excess of 400 (Powell & 
Renko, 2010a)  The dates of the announcements of purchase decisions ranged from 
1981 (Australia) to 1993 (Malaysia).  With the exception of Kuwait and Malaysia, all 
of the export buyers participated in the assembly of their aircraft.  The same group 
(Australia, Canada, Spain, Switzerland, and Finland) all participated, also to varying 
degrees, in the mid-life upgrades that they had all ordered.  Without exception, all of 
the countries in this group claimed significant industrial benefits and technological 
advances from their experiences with the aircraft.11 This  resulted in a high level of 
satisfaction with the performance of their aircraft and their working experience with 
U.S. Navy and industry personnel.  
However, not all the projects were trouble-free, particularly with respect to the 
application of U.S. export control and technology transfer regulations.  As noted 
                                            
11  This and related information was obtained in a series of confidential interviews held with 
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above in this section, this aircraft was an already existing and in-service weapons 
system in the U.S. Navy and no sophisticated buyer would have expected to have 
carte blanche access to its complete technology suite.  They did not enter as dues-
paying partners, participating in the development process almost from the very start 
(as in the F-35 program).  Most of the complaints dealt with more mundane issues 
like transfer of spare parts and test and repair capabilities between countries that 
had already been certified as members of the F-18 user community.  
One would have thought that the securing of a blanket retransfer agreement 
in 2001,from the State Department would have resolved such problems.  Ostensibly, 
it covered the retransfer of  
common and unclassified items and tech data of the F/A-18 weapon system 
between the international users; [freed such users from any] requirement to 
apply for advance USG consent for items on the “Master List” ; [and 
delegated to PMA265] authority to amend/mod the “Master List” by 
Department of State (DOS)..   
Over time it became clear this authority was also necessary to allow users to 
coordinate joint development efforts.  
An MOU was obtained in 2005 to address this issue.  It allowed “multinational 
exchange of information and initiation, conduct and management of cooperative 
efforts [and also permitted] cooperation in acquisition arrangements and research, 
development, testing, evaluation, and production (including follow-on support) 
efforts” (Powell and  Renko, 2010b). 
The arrangement that arose from these understandings is depicted in Figure 
2.  The agreements between the U.S. and the FMS customers allowed for much 
freer exchange of information between the various F-18 air forces and their trusted 
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Figure 2. F-18 FMA Process 
                                 Source: Powell and Renko, 2010a 
Bilateral clarifications and modifications would appear on their face to 
alleviate potential problems, but a seemingly minor point (that they apply only to 
government-to-government transactions) became a troublesome issue.  For 
example, it was assumed that international customers would make use of in-country 
support, which is to say local industry in support of government organizations.  The 
ownership of the support organization would play a role in determining the necessity 
for a third party transfer permit from the U.S. Department of State.   
Thus, if the support organization was a government organization, perhaps an 
armory, no third party transfer  would be necessary because the transaction would 
then be considered government to government.  If, the facility were privatized,12 and 
nothing else changed, such a transfer permit would likely be required.  If there were 
two private support organizations located in different countries attempting to deal 
with one another, the complexity could easily grow even more. 
                                            






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 20 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
A related problem is found in the State Department’s definition of the term 
“agent.”  Existing FMS rules limit transfer rights and the ability to use intellectual 
property and material to a customer government and/or its agents.  The word “agent” 
has been used to mean a freight forwarder only.  Contractors fall outside of that 
definition,and in an environment where increased use has been made of 
outsourcing, wherein government employees work with a workforce of contractors, 
such a narrow definition has caused difficulties. 
Under current ITAR regulations, the export of components and spare parts 
must be separately approved, even when they are to be used in support of 
previously approved and exported end products. 
Although the above examples represent problems that have been 
encountered through the life of the F/A-18 export sales, a new and widespread 
concern has appeared as the U.S. Navy approaches the end of its production run for 
that aircraft as its planned acquisition of the F-35C looms.  Many of the foreign users 
of the F/A-18 intend to continue their use of that aircraft after the U.S. Navy expects 
to retire its use of that plane.  The closure of U.S. production lines has introduced a 
serious concern about continued access to U.S. supplied parts and other essential 
components for foreign inventories.  The Navair International Programs group has 
undertaken a major effort to alleviate that potential problem through careful advance 
planning.  This effort has been described in  the Navair document entitled 
“Sundown/Sunrise Plan” (Powell and Renko, 2010b).  This effort was widely praised 
by the foreign representatives with whom we met. 
D. Summing Up the F/A-18 Program Experience 
In our ongoing series of studies of multinational weapon system projects, we 
have encountered somewhat different attitudes toward the problem of dealing with 
U.S. export control and technology transfer regulations.  We have identified several 
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independent of one another but they may help in understanding how essentially the 
same set of regulations may have varied so widely in the reactions of the players. 
1) Where the foreign participants appeared on the scene in the life cycle 
of the system.  U.S. defense acquisition and life cycle management 
processes basically center on three stages: (a) pre-systems acquisition 
(engineering and manufacturing development); (b) acquisition 
(continued engineering and manufacturing development, production 
and deployment); and (c) sustainment (operations and support).  All 
other things being the same, the closer the foreign party enters prior to 
systems acquisition (or earlier in the process), information sharing will 
generally be easier. 
2) Exogeneous conditions surrounding the entry time.  For example, the 
stringency of enforcement can be expected to increase in periods of 
crisis such as what occurred after the attacks on the U.S. on 11 
September 2001 (GAO, 2005). 
3) The degree of risk tolerance among project administrators.  It is 
generally easier (and safer) to reject a request for change than to grant 
it.  The attitude of superiors plays an important role here.  For example, 
is a mistake viewed as a learning opportunity or a “kiss of death”? 
4) The culture from which the administrator originates.  Engineers, 
broadly speaking, are trained to be problem solvers, whereas lawyers 
are more inclined to be problem finders (and then take steps to close 
loopholes). 
5) The nature of the purchase agreement may influence access to 
information.  Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arrangements are often 
viewed as more likely to be associated with more liberal information 
sharing than direct commercial sales because the military Service 
whose weapon system is involved in the transaction serves, to some 
extent, as the intermediary between the buyer and the U.S. 
government. 
E. Postscript: Is the F/A-18 Program a Good Fourth-
Generation Hedge for a Fifth Generation Program? 
The combination of the continued success of the F-18 program combined with 
the well-known, long-running, and very expensive troubles with the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF) may well make the F-18 something of an embarrassment to the U.S. 
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fighter modernization.  The F/A-18 successes have been embodied in new models 
such as the Super Hornets (F/A-18 E/F and EF-18G), but also in upgrades to older 
models. 
For example, in January 2011, Defense Secretary Gates announced that the 
U.S. Navy would buy 41 additional F/A-18s (Super Hornets) to address the gap 
caused by delays in F-35 deliveries.  Somewhat earlier, Australia increased its order 
of Super Hornets by 24 units for the same reason—and also to fill the gap in its 
forces caused by the retirement of F-111 aircraft. (Warwick, 2011; Hennigan, 2011) 
Whether Warwick’s (2011) journalistic spin, which suggests that the “growth 
Hornet” is a “JSF Killer,” is prophetic or far off the mark remains to be seen.  
Spokespersons for the U.S. and Australia insist that the additional F/A-18 orders are 
simply gap fillers (Warwick, 2011).  In any case, Boeing is offering a menu of F-18 
upgrades, including signature reductions, for F-18 customers (current and potential, 
Fulghum, 2011).  It appears that the F-18 case rests on that fighter often being good 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 23 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
V. Wrapping Up 
As noted above, this report is a companion piece to the efforts of our 
colleagues at Cranfield (Ito, 2011).  They focused on a current international tactical 
fighter program—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.  We took on the F/A-18 Hornet—also 
an international tactical fighter program.  Without taking exception to their findings 
and conclusions, we conclude that ITAR’s effects vary with a number of situational 
variables, including the structure of the program, timing of the transactions (post-
9/11 vs. pre-), and the parts played by the many program administrators (both 
aircraft program managers and ITAR administrators). 
A. The Administration’s Export Control Initiatives 
Export control in general, especially ITAR, is a moving target for researchers. 
After a long and rather unsuccessful history of attempts to reform the Cold-War 
vintage collection of U.S. arms transfer regulations, a new attempt shows promise of 
adoption.  In April 2010, the White House announced a new Administration plan for 
sweeping reforms aimed at the establishment of a single control list, administered by 
a single agency for licensing and enforcement, using a single information 
technology.  
The foundation for this initiative comes, among other things, from a review of 
the U.S. Export Control System to identify possible reforms, which was directed by 
President Obama.  In an August 2009 statement, he commented that “we need 
fundamental reform in all four areas of our current system in what we control, how 
we control it, how we enforce those controls, and how we manage our controls” 
(White House, 2010).   
The “interagency task force” that conducted the review reported the current 
system as seriously (if not comprehensively) broken.  This assessment was based 
on observed fragmentation and duplication of function and authority, grossly 
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(White House, 2010).  The overarching recommendation from the task force was “to 
build higher walls around a smaller yard” and focus efforts on the “crown jewels.”13  
The President supported those findings and recommendations, and embarked on a 
program of “fundamental reform” (White House, 2010). 
Furthermore, the Administration has made those reforms a major initiative.  
The effort was launched in 2010, and was reaffirmed in 2011 (White House, 2010, 
2011b).  In addition, a number of initiatives have been introduced to establish special 
understandings with various nations with whom the U.S. is on good terms—a recent 
example being India (White House, 2011a).  Incidentally, this effort dovetails nicely 
with the Administration’s proposals for export promotion (Kaye-Scholler LLP, 2010). 
The reform program focuses on four key areas: control list, enforcement 
coordination, information technology (IT), and licensing.  The overall intent is to 
achieve “transformation” to a unified system (e.g., with a single control list).  Getting 
there entails changes authorized by both the Executive (Executive Orders) and 
Congress (new legislation).   
The Administration views reform as occurring in three phases.  First, items 
are stated as immediate improvements to the existing system (likely built on 
Executive Orders)—in all four areas.  The second phase is a “fundamentally new 
U.S. export control system,”  and entails notification of, and coordination with, 
Congress.  The third phase completes the transition to the new system and involves 
new legislation (White House, 2010). 
                                            
13 In a very real sense, this echoes the old saying “he who protects everything protects 
nothing,” attributed to Sun Tzu and Frederick the Great, among others.  Our Cranfield 
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B. Export Control: Some Questions for Further Research 
There is a considerable body of research done in case study form.  There are 
also a number of publicly available reports (e.g., Gates, 2006), which provide 
interesting anecdotal information.  There is more research to be done.   
Based on our research thus far, we believe the following is a partial list of 
questions to be pursued. 
1) What are the full costs imposed by the ITAR regime?  To taxpayers?  
U.S. industries?  To allies?  Although there is a broad understanding 
that ITAR does indeed impose costs, there is clearly more to be done -
-  including (a) cataloging the impacts, (b) quantifying those impacts, 
and (c) measuring the effects (perhaps in monetary terms).14   
2) To what extent can ITAR reform address those costs? 
3) Is ITAR fundamentally incompatible with operational sovereignty?  If 
not, how can that problem be addressed?  “Operational sovereignty” 
(or “appropriate sovereignty”) was a key part of the UK’s Defense 
Industrial Strategy (UK MOD, 2005).  We think it is key to 
understanding the defense industrial concerns of allied nations in the 
international defense market. 
4) Is a network of “most favored nations” workable in the current ITAR 
regime?15  Advantageous?  Inadvisable?  Would it be useful if effective 
export control reform were fully implemented?
                                            
14 These steps are, of course, part of standard Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) methodology 
(Boardman, et al., 2006, p. 6). 
15 This is part of a set of bilateral initiatives involving Australia, the UK, India, and other 
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